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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Petition for rehearing may be filed within fourteen days after entry of decision. 
Utah R App P Rule 35 [Petition for rehearing.] 
Time for filing is computed by excluding the day from which the period begins 
and including the last day; furthermore when any paper has been served via mail, 
an additional three days is added to the prescribed period. 
Utah R App P Rule 22 [Computation and enlargement of time.] 
Court of appeals retains jurisdiction over the case and no remittitur can issue 
until expiration of time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
Utah R App P Rule 36 [Issuance of remittitur.] 
Utah R App P Rule 48 [Time for petitioning.] 
Hi-Country Homeowners v Foothills Water 942 P.2d 305 (UT 1996) 
December 17,1998, (Thurs.), Memorandum Decision was filed & mailed. 
December 31,1998, (Thurs.), is fourteen days after entry of decision. 
January 4,1999, (Mon.), is the last day for filing petition for rehearing since 
three days are added for reason Memorandum Decision was mailed; however last day 
falls on Sunday, and therefore, next business day is last day to file. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
MOOTNESS CANNOT DEFEAT CLAIM THAT 
TRIBUNAL LACKED JURISDICTION IN THE CASE. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Question of jurisdiction is decided by the appeals court de novo and 
as a matter of law without deference to the trial court. 
Holm v Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992) 
[Jurisdiction decided by appeals court as question of law 
without deference to the District Court] 
Rimensburger v Rimensburger 841 P. 2d 709 (Utah App. 1992) 
[Jurisdiction reviewed as question of law by appeals court 
independently without deference to trial court.] 
Curtis v Curtis 789 P.2d 717 (Utah App. 1990) 
[If court lacks jurisdiction over subject matter or individuals 
involved, it has no power to entertain the suit.] 
Barlow v Cappo 821 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1991) 
[Jurisdiction is reviewed by appeals court de novo 
and as a matter of law.] 
Kamdar & Co. v Larav Co.. Inc. 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991) 
[Appellate court review is de novo to determine whether 
as a matter of law jurisdiction exists.] 
Van Per Stappen v Van Per Stappen 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991) 
[Question of whether jurisdiction exists is one of law, 
reviewed by appeals court without deference 
to the trial court] 
State. Pept. of Social Services v Vijil 784 P 2d 1130 (Utah 1989) 
[Jurisdictional determination decided by appeals court as 
question of law without deference to the district court.] 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/96) 
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.) 
UTAH CASE LAW 
Green v Green 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) 
State v Garcia 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (CA 7/16/98) 
State. Dept. of Social Services v Vijil 784 P 2d 1130 (Utah 1989) 
FEDERAL CASE LAW 
Facio v Jones 714 F. Supp. 504 (D. Utah 1988) 
Layton v Swapp 484 F.Supp. 958 (DC UT 1979) 
Morton v Ruiz 415 US 199. 39 L Ed 2d 270. 94 S Ct 1055 (1974) 
Thompson v Citv of Louisville 362 US 199. 80 S Ct 624. 4 L Ed 2d 654 (1960) 
United States v Nixon 418 US 683. 41 L Ed 2d 1039. 94 S Ct 3090 (1974) 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] Utah Constitution 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant filed with administrative agency ["DLD"] Motion to Dismiss & 
Memorandum of Authority based upon lacked jurisdiction since no sworn report was 
filed as required by agency rule [UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" 
(10/1/96)]: [UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.)]. 
Agency did not contest, challenge, deny existence, or dispute existence or validity of its 
own administrative rule; however, believed that unsworn report was a "non-substantive 
issue" denied reconsideration and suspended defendant's license. 
Appellant filed timely appeal to the District Court and filed a "Motion to Vacate 
Agency Action for Lack of Jurisdiction [No Sworn Report] & Memorandum of Authority. 
District Court has derivative jurisdiction only over appeals from administrative agencies 
[UAC 62-46d-15 "Judicial Review]: therefore, if the agency had no jurisdiction because 
of failure to abide by its own regulation, the District Court acquired no jurisdiction. 
Agency in the District Court did not contest, challenge, deny, or dispute 
existence or validity of its own administrate rule; however, notwithstanding same, 
District Court found agency jurisdiction and therefore denied the motion on grounds 
not raised by either party. 
Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals from the district court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
May 31,1997 (Sat), defendant was arrested by the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office for "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol." [Citation # D 268425] 
June 4,1997 (Wed.), Utah County Sheriffs Office postmarked to the 
Driver License Division copy of Citation # D 268425. 
June 18,1997 (Wed.), Driver License Division gave notice to the defendant 
that hearing would be held based upon the officer's written [unsworn] report. 
June 27,1997 (Fri.), Informal hearing scheduled and held in Orem, Utah, 
before hearing officer Herb Wilson. 
June 30,1997 (Mon.), defendant filed a written request for Hearing Officer's 
findings of fact ["reasons for decision]. 
July 16,1997 (Wed.), order was postmarked from agency indicating defendant 
was suspended, effective date of 6/29/97. 
July 22,1997 (Tues.), findings ["reason for decision"] postmarked from the 
agency to counsel. 
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August 13,1997 (Wed.), pursuant to the defendant's statutory right of 
administrative review, filed with the agency this date "Request for Reconsideration." 
August 20,1997, Agency in response to a request for reconsideration issued its 
final agency action [as the appellate court has defined by case law] by letter. See: 
Maverick Country Stores v Industrial Comm'n 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993). 
September 17,1997, Petition for review was filed with the Third District Court 
within thirty days of final agency action as provided for and allowed by the code. See; 
UCA 63-46 b-14 "Judicial review- Exhaustion of administrative remedies/' 
September 24,1997, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Agency Action for Lack 
of Jurisdiction [No Sworn Report] said motion being consistent with and provided for by 
CJA Rule 4-501 "Motions." 
Appellant filed a timely appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
[Point of Law or Facts Misapprehended] 
Defendant at all times before the administrative agency challenged its jurisdiction 
for failure to comply with its own regulations which require a "sworn report" as follows: 
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/96) 
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.) 
A claim of mootness does not supercede, or defeat a claim of lack of jurisdiction 
by the original tribunal. In no case in which the appellate court has asserted mootness 
has there been an underlying claim that the original tribunal totally lacked jurisdiction 
over the case based upon a specific regulation, which contrary to agency assertions, 
existed both prior to the defendant's hearing and after the defendant's hearing thereby 
entitling him to rely thereon and require that the court examine the issue in its entirety 
notwithstanding any assertion of mootness by the agency. 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
Page 8 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
Counsel, pursuant to rule, certifies that this petition for rehearing is presented 
in good faith, not for delay, and raises legitimate issues in this case which it believed 
the court has either overlooked or misapprehended the nature of the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mootness cannot defeat a claim that an agency tribunal lacked jurisdiction in a 
case for failure to follow its own administrative regulation shown to exist both before the 
date of hearing and after the date of hearing. 
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT 
MOOTNESS CANNOT DEFEAT CLAIM THAT 
TRIBUNAL LACKED JURISDICTION IN THE CASE. 
Utah Administrative Code section in issue was enacted 10/01/96 prior io 
the date of the defendant's arrest or hearing, and it required the officer to submit 
a "sworn report" to the agency within five days after the date of arrest. 
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/96) 
"... The officer shall send to the department within five days after 
the date of arrest the person's license, along with a copy of the citation 
issued and the officer's sworn report indicating the chemical test results 
(if any) and other information relevant to the arrest and chemical test...." 
This particular section, was republished 10/01/97 after the date of the 
defendant's hearing and appears in the supplement to the administrative code 
as follows: 
UAC R708-14-1 "Administrative Suspension Hearing" (10/1/97 Supp.) 
"... The officer shall send to the department within five days after 
the date of arrest the person's license, along with a copy of the citation 
issued and the officer's sworn report indicating the chemical test results 
(if any) and other information relevant to the arrest and chemical test...." 
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Where the appellant has been deprived of a right guaranteed to him by statute 
or by regulations issued pursuant thereto, he has been denied due process pursuant 
to the Court of Appeals own decision as follows: 
State v Garcia 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (CA 7/16/98) 
"The second form of protection provided under the Due Process 
Clause requires that states follow certain procedural rules where failure to 
do so implicates a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory right of the 
defendant. See United States es rel. Accardi v Shaughnessey, 347 U.S 
260, 265, 74 S. Ct. 499 502 (1954) (stating "crucial question is 
whether the alleged conduct... deprived petitioner of any of the 
rights guaranteed by him by the statute or by the regulations issued 
pursuant thereto."); cf. United States v. Carceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749, 99 
S. Ct. 1465, 1470(1979)." 
It is incumbent upon the administrative agency to follow its own internal 
procedures even when such internal procedures are more rigorous than would 
otherwise be required. 
Morton v Ruiz 415 US 199. 39 L Ed 2d 270. 94 S Ct 1055 (1974) 
"...@ pg 294 ... Where the rights of individuals are affected, it 
is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so 
even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than 
otherwise would be required. Service v Dulles, 354 US 363, 388, 
1 L Ed 2d 1403, 77 S Ct 1152 (1957); Vitarelli v Seaton, 359 US 535, 
539-540, 3 L Ed 2d 1012, 79 S Ct 968 (1959)...." 
Layton v Swapp 484 F.Supp. 958 (DC UT 1979) 
"...@pg 961 ...Implicit in the concept of "due process" are two ideas: 
First, government, here Davis County government, must follow its own 
rules. Second, it must do so within a reasonable time...." 
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An agency is free to repeal any regulation in its entirety, but where it is 
shown that the regulation existed both prior to the defendant's hearing and after the 
defendant's hearing, the agency is required to follow its regulation and the courts are 
required to examine and enforce same. 
United States v Nixon 418 US 683. 41 L Ed 2d 1039. 94 S Ct 3090 (1974) 
"...@ pg 1057 ... [8] So long as this regulation is extant it has the 
force of law. In United States ex rel. Accardi v Shaughnessy, 347 US 
260, 98 L Ed 681, 74 S Ct 499 (1954)... 
...Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible of the Attorney 
General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special 
Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so.10 So long as this 
regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, 
and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the 
three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it..." 
The jurisdiction of the district court over the appeal from the administrative action 
was derivative only since the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for a judicial 
review after exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
UCA 63-46b-14 "Judicial review -
Exhaustion of administrative remedies." 
"(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency 
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued 
under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)." 
Final agency action (8/20/97) See; Maverick Country Stores v Industrial 
Comm'n 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993). 
Appellant Petition for ReHearing 
DPS v Mair 
CaseNo.98-1523-CA 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Page 12 
Once the case was appealed to the district court, there existed a duty to 
specifically examine whether the agency properly exercised jurisdiction contrary to its 
own regulations. If the agency did not properly exercise jurisdiction then the district 
court had no jurisdiction other than to vacate the agency action. See; 
Allred v Allred 835 P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1992) 
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v Lamoreaux 767 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1989) 
Thompson v Jackson 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1987) 
If in fact the regulations existed both prior to and after the defendant's 
administrative hearing, it raises question as to whether or not this particular defendant 
has clearly been denied due process notwithstanding any other issue or repeal of the 
regulation subsequent to his case being heard. 
State Dept. of Social Services v Vijil 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989) 
"...@ pg 1132 ...[W]hen a motion to vacate a judgment 
is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court 
has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment 
cannot stand without denying due process to the one 
against whom it runs...." 
Brimhall v Mecham 27 UT 2d 222. 494 P.2d 525 (Utah 1972) 
"...@pg 526...A judgment is void...if the court which rendered 
it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it acted 
in a manner inconsistent with due process of law...." 
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If an underlying judgment is void because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the 
passage of time alone cannot legitimate or otherwise make such ruling valid. There is 
no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. A void judgment cannot acquire 
validity because of passage of time See: Green v Green 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). 
An order and judgment is void for lack of due process in its rendition if the tribunal 
"acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
substantive right of due process is of no avail unless the court grants him the ancillary 
right of appeal. 
Thompson v City of Louisville 362 US 199. 80 S Ct 624. 
4 L Ed 2d 654 (1960) 
"... @ pg 657 ... Appellee's substantive right of due process 
is of no avail to him unless this court grants him the ancillary right 
whereby he may test same in the Supreme Court...." 
This case is significant for reason that the issue of mootness became 
significantly entwined with the extraordinary relief granted by the United States 
Supreme Court, and the significance of the case is such that it is enclosed in its entirety 
in the appendix hereto. 
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Finally, within a different context, the United States District Court for Utah 
was required to interpret the United States Supreme Court decision which held that the 
requirement of showing a meritorious defense as necessary to set aside a default 
judgment was unconstitutional. [Peralta v Heights Medical Center. Inc.. 485 US 80. 
108 S Ct. 896. 99 L Ed 75 (1988)]. Argument had been made that the issue was moot 
because the judgment had been paid in full although involuntarily through garnishment. 
Notwithstanding said fact, the Federal District Court for Utah rejected the idea that 
the constitutional rights of a particular individual may be violated in the interest of 
judicial economy even though there clearly was a procedural violation. The court in so 
ruling held "It is manifest that judicial economy is not a valid basis or reason to 
justify the violation of constitutional rights...." [Facio v Jones 714 F. Supp. 504 
(D. Utah 1988)]. The Tenth Circuit vacated the decision on other grounds, 
specifically that Utah Supreme Court should be given an opportunity to first consider 
the issue before the Federal Courts intervene. See: Facio v Jones 929 F.2d 541 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
Administrative agencies are required to comply with their own rules and in this 
case the agency did not challenge or deny existence of its own rule, and furthermore, is 
precluded by United States Supreme Court decisions from attacking its own rule. 
Agency may amend or revoke the rule at any time, but may not do so in a case in which 
a party relies thereon. In no prior appellate decision, where mootness was an issue, 
was there an underlying claim that the original tribunal totally lacked jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, in the case before the court, the regulation complained of existed both 
prior to the defendant's hearing and after the defendant's hearing. Therefore, the claim 
of lack of jurisdiction goes not only to due process under the Utah State Constitution 
and federal constitution, but also the guarantee under the state constitution that the 
court will resort to fundamental principles as follows: 
Article I Section 27 [Fundamental Rights] Utah Constitution 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to 
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government." 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
It is respectively suggested that the court has misapprehended the nature of 
the legal claim which defendant raises, and in light of further explanation, request 
is made that the matter be restored to the calendar for full briefing. 
DATED this t f l S ^ d a v
 o f < ^ ^ / W ? % t ^ ^ ^ 1 9 <% 
Steven Lee(Pa) 
Attorney for Defendant / Appeflartt 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
DEC 1 7 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Department of Public Safety, 
Driver License Division, State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Lonnie R. Mair, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981523-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 17, 1998) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
Attorneys Steven Lee Payton, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant appeals from an order of the district court 
denying his motion to vacate the findings and conclusions of the 
Department of Public Safety. We dismiss the appeal as moot. 
Appellant has already served his ninety day suspension and 
this court can, therefore, provide no meaningful relief. See 
Phillips v. Schwendiman. 802 P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
Phillips, this court dismissed two consolidated appeals as moot 
where the appeals were filed after the appellants1 license 
revocation periods had expired, noting that "Utah courts have 
consistently refused to hear the merits of driver's license 
revocation appeals rendered moot because the revocation period 
has expired." Phillips. 802 P.2d at 110. See also Jones v. 
Schwendiman. 721 P.2d 893,894 (Utah 1986) (case is moot where 
requested judicial relief cannot affect rights of the litigants, 
such as where order of license revocation has expired by its own 
terms). 
In his memorandum in opposition to this courtfs sua sponte 
motion to dismiss, appellant spends a great deal of time 
expounding generally the federal constitutional implications of 
the appellee's actions, characterizing the issue as 
"significant." However, appellant ignores the fundamental 
reality of mootness. The focus of the mootness inquiry is 
whether any requested judicial relief can affect the rights of 
the litigants. With the expiration of the relatively short 
expiration period, any "opinion issued by this court would have 
no practical or significant legal effect upon the validity of the 
revocation [] or upon appellantfs legal rights." Phillips, 802 
P.2d at 110. 
Nor would the requested result remedy a recurring wrong 
affecting the public interest yet evading appellate review. The 
departmental regulation upon which the alleged inconsistent 
departmental action is based has been amended to conform to the 
repeal of the statutory requirement for a sworn report, and the 
issue raised by appellant cannot arise again. Thus, "the issue 
raised is not of sufficient public interest that we should hear 
its merits." Id. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot. 
£cudith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
>rman H. Jacks^fi, Judge 
% 
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UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE 
PUBLIC SAFETY 
R708. DRIVER LICENSE 
October 1, 1996 
MlCEE 
CHASLOTESVILLE, "VteGBOA 
L = Restricted to vehicles not equipped Yrith air 
brakes, 
M = Motorcycle, 
N ss Tank vehicle. 
P = Passengers, 
S = School bus. (includes P) 
T = Double or triple trailers. 
X = Hazardous material and tank combination. 
Z = Taxis. 
R708-10-4. Restrictions, 
A =s None. 
B = Corrective lenses. 
C ss Mechanical aid. 
D ss Prosthetic aid. 
E = Automatic transmission. 
F s= Outside mirror. 
G ss Daylight only. 
I «3 l imit - other. 
J s= Other. 
O s= 90 cc or les3 motorcycle. 
U s= a 3 Trbeel cycle. 
Vsr 40mph or less.' 
W s= medicaL 
References: 63-3-401 et aeq. 
History: 10122, AMD, 09/05/89; 16314, 5YR, 11/15/94; 
16315, NSC, 12/01/94. 
R70S-14-1 
indicating .08% or more can result in suspension or 
revocation of the personTlicensa or privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle.
 # 
If the person submits to that chemical test and the 
results indicate a blood alcohol content of ,08% or 
more, or if the oEcer makes a determination based 
on reasonable grounds that the person is otherwise 
in violation of Section 41-644, the officer shall serve * 
on the person on behalf of the department, immedi-
ate notice of the department's intention to suspend 
the person's privilege or. license to drive. Drivers 
who refuse the chemical test will be dealt .with 
according to policy and procedure Number IH-1 in 
compliance with Utah Code Section 41-6-44.10. 
(The department may use its discretion in grant-
ing hearings to drivers who make their request 
beyond the ten days allowed by statute as it deems 
appropriate. When granted, such bearings may as a 
condition to being granted, be held beyond the 29 
day limit set by statute in which case the suspension 
would become effective on the 30th day after arrest 
and would not be held in abeyance pending the 
outcome of the bearing.) 
If the officer serves that immediate notice on 
behalf of the department, he shall take the Utah 
driver license or permit of the driver and issue a 
effective for 29 days only and 
- Provisional license 
temporary license - -
supply to the driver information regarding how to 
I n s t r u c t i o n B u l l e t i n . g five days after the cats of arrest the person's license, 
R708-14-1. Aknini^u-veSuspe^on Hearing (Per S e ) . | along with a copy of the » £ & « te^md fte 
R703-14-2. Limited licences. •& nFHr^ r'fi sworn report indicating the chemical test 
R70S-14-3. Hearings on Refusal to Submit to Che=icaM
 r e s u ] t s (^ anyj and oilier information relevant to tne 
list ^arrest and chemical test. 
R70S-14-4. Point System Hearings — 21+ Years Old. U f a t t e n request from the arrested person, 
"" ' ~ """" made within ten days of the date ofarrest, a Hearing 
shall be granted before the department: within 29 
days after the date of arrest in the county in which 
the arrest occurred unless the department and the 
person agree that the hearing shall be held in some 
° Policy - It is the department's policy for a hearing 
officer or hearing examiner in the field to conduct 
the hearing specified by law and in accordance with 
administrative rale and submit a report ^ t a p e 
recording of the proceedings of the hearing to Dnver 
Srrices Administration. Action b y the Department 
will follow in accordance with the:rep ort enbrnitted. 
Procedure - The Central Office D.UX Secaon will, 
u n t i m e l y receipt of a report o fDW " r e i t w d a 
S L l y request for a hearing from the arrested 
S in Compliance with Section 41-2-130 sched-
ule a time and place for the hearing to be held. The 
S v e r T S e arresting officer, the hearing officer, and 
9 Authority U.C jraicSorraEErao-. When a peace o n y e r , ^ - ^ b e notified. 
Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a a n y ^ e s s e 3 J £ g a f ^ rules of evidence and 
person may be violating or has violated Section i l s T ~ f n v f l 1 1 n o t strictly apply, the hearing officer, 
41-6^,thepeaceoScermay,inconnectionwithhis V^£^^^*g&substantially coin-
arrest oftheperson, request the person to submit to ^ ^ d u c t a g ^ h e a r m g . ^
 rf ^ ^ ^ fa 
R70S-14-5. Point System Hearing 
1S-20 Years OldL 
R70M4-5a. Coding Table. 
R70&-14-5b. VioktioaCcdeforYTiiichAction^illb^Taken 
en In-State Failure to Comply. 
R70S-14-5c MVR Ceding Table. 
R708-14-6. No-Fault Insurance Suspension. 
R708-14-7. Fatal Accident Hearings. 
R708-14-8. In-state Failure to Appear CF.TA-'s). 
R70S-14-9. Hearing Regarding Medical Issues and Special 
Exaininationj. .
 # 
R70S-14-10. Fraudulent or Unlawful Use of a Dnver Li-
cense, 
R70S-14-H. Fmmdal Responsibility Hearing. 
R706-14-12, Hearing on Violation of Learner Permit. 
R70S-14-13. Leaving the Scene of an Acddent or Otber 
Serious Violation," ^ 
R708-14-1. AcTministrative S u ^ e n s i o n H e a n n g 
(Per ge) . ^r^^-^™^*^ 
Authority U . a £ § S t e o 3 5 l & S 3 
& 
October 1,1996 
UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE 
S U P P L E M E N T 
BINDER 5 
PARDONS (BOARD OF) TO WORKFORCE SERVICES 
October 1, 1997 
Insert this pamphlet at the front of Binder 5 
MlCHIE 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 
R708-6-3 (10/97) PUBLIC SAFETY 8 
R708-6-3. Provisions. 
(1) Drivers eligible for the license Renewal-By-Mail 
program may not have more than four traffic violations or 
any reckless driving convictions on their driving record 
during the five years prior to the date of expiration. 
(a) During the same five year period, the driver's record 
may not contain suspension(s), revocation(s), or medical 
impairment which may represent a hazard to public safety. 
(2) Drivers that have changed their name or do not have 
the appropriate restrictions as per (Section 53-3-208) on 
their present driver's license are not eligible to renew 
through the mail. 
(3) The Driver License Division will contact eligible 
drivers by mail approximately 90 days prior to the expira-
tion of their driver licenses. 
(a) Drivers will be mailed an application form, medical 
questionnaire, and general instructions. 
(b) Drivers renewing 6 months prior to their 65th birth-
day, or who are currently over 65 years old, must furnish a 
current Eye Examination Form or have an eye exam at a 
Driver License Examining Office before renewing through 
the mail. 
(c) Drivers will mail in the completed application and 
appropriate fee to the Driver License Division, after which 
the division will mail out a renewal sticker to be placed on 
the back of the driver's present license. 
(4) A driver whose current license has been renewed by 
mail, may not renew by mail in the following renewal cycle. 
Drivers may renew by mail only once in a ten year period. 
(5) Drivers whose driving record would allow them to 
renew by mail but whose current license was previously 
renewed through the mail, will be sent a notification that 
must be taken to a Driver License Examination Office to 
complete the renewal process. 
(6) It is the responsibility of drivers to insure that their 
present licenses are renewed before expiration. If a Re-
newal-By-Mail application is received after the expiration 
of a license, it will be returned to the applicant and they 
will be required to appear at a Driver License Examination 
Office. 
(7) Commercial drivers under the "Commercial Driver 
License Act" do not qualify for the Renewal-by-Mail pro-
gram as per Subsection 53-3-214(3)(b). 
References: 53-3-214. 
History: 9196, NEW, 02/17/88; 10121, AMD, 09/05/89; 
12743, AMD, 06/23/92; 12888, NSC, 06/25/92; 18596, 5YR, 
01/23/97; 18573, NSC, 06/03/97. 
R708-9. Repealed. 
History: 18859, REP, 05/16/97. 
R708-14. Driver Improvement and Control Instruc-
tion Bulletin. 
R708-14-1. Administrative Suspension Hearing (PerSe). 
R708-14-2. Limited Licenses. 
R708-14-3. Hearings on Refusal to Submit to Chemical 
Test. 
R708-14-4. Point System Hearings - 21+ Years Old. 
R708-14-5. Point System Hearings - Provisional License 
16-20 Years Old. 
R708-14-5a. Coding Table. 
R708-14-6. No-Fault Insurance Suspension. 
R708-14-7. Fatal Accident Hearings. 
R708-14-8. Instate Failure to Appear (F.T.A.'s). 
R708-14-9. Hearing Regarding Medical Issues and Special 
Examinations. 
R708-14-10. Fraudulent or Unlawful Use of a Driver Li-
cense. 
R708-14-11. Financial Responsibility Hearing. 
R708-14-12. Hearing On Violation of Learner Permit. 
R708-14-13. Leaving the scene of an accident or other 
serious violation. 
SKrIWfTy U.L.A. 41-^-iSdi. "When a peace officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violat-
ing or has violated Section 41-6-44, the peace officer may, in 
connection with his arrest of the person, request the person 
to submit to a chemical test. 
The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the 
person's submission to a chemical test that results indicat-
ing .08% or more can result in suspension or revocation of 
the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
If the person submits to that chemical test and the 
results indicate a blood alcohol content of .08% or more, or 
if the officer makes a determination based on reasonable 
grounds that the person is otherwise in violation of Section 
41-6-44, the officer shall serve on the person on behalf of 
the department, immediate notice of the department's 
intention to suspend the person's privilege or license to 
drive. Drivers who refuse the chemical test will be dealt 
with according to policy and procedure Number HI-1 in 
compliance with Utah Code 41-6-44.10. 
(The department may use its discretion in granting 
hearings to drivers who make their request beyond the ten 
days allowed by statute as it deems appropriate. When 
granted, such hearings may as a condition to being 
granted, be held beyond the 29 day limit set by statute in 
which case the suspension would become effective on the 
30th day after arrest and would not be held in abeyance 
pending the outcome of the hearing.) 
If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf of 
the department, he shall take the Utah driver license or 
permit of the driver and issue a temporary license effective 
for 29 days only and supply to the driver information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the 
department. 
^ The officer shall send to the department within five days 
I after the date ot arrest the person's license, along with a 
I copy of the citation issued and theofficer'sswornreport 
I indicating the chemical test results™rn^anyT^ana^otne 
I information relevant to the arrest and chemical test. 
I Upon written request from the arrested person, made 
within ten days of the date of arrest, a hearing shall be 
granted before the department within 29 days after the 
date of arrest in the county in which the arrest occurred 
unless the department and the person agree that the 
hearing shall be held in. some other county. 
Policy - It is the department's policy for a hearing officer 
or hearing examiner in the field to conduct the hearing 
specified by law and in accordance with administrative 
rule and submit a report and tape recording of the proceed-
ings of the hearing to Driver Services Administration. 
Action by the Department will follow in accordance with 
the report submitted. 
Procedure - The Central Office D.U.I. Section will, upon 
timely receipt of a report of DUI arrest and a timely 
request for a hearing from the arrested person in compli-
ance with Section 41-2-130, schedule a time and place for 
the hearing to be held. The driver, the arresting officer, the 
hearing officer, and any witnesses will be notified. 
Hearing - While formal rules of evidence and procedure 
shall not strictly apply, the hearing officer, in conducting 
the hearing, shall substantially comply with the funda-
mental rules of due process in legal proceedings. Sworn 
testimony will be taken, and the driver shall have the 
privilege of having witnesses present in his behalf. He may 
offer testimony and may cross examine those who testify 
against him. 
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Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East, Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111-3298 
RE: Lonnie R. Man-
File No: 6979605 
Dear Mr. Payton: 
August 20,1997 
Your request for reconsideration in the case of Lonnie R. Mair was granted and 
consideration has been made. Based upon preponderance of the evidence presented at the 
administrative hearing, held on June 27, 1997, it is deteimined to sustain the findings, 
conclusions, and decision of the presiding officer. 
Since the presiding officer is sustained, your request for a stay of action, the issue of time 
computation, and the unsworn report become non-substantive issues. 
Sincerely, 
Wallace G. Wintle 
Manager 
Driver Services Bureau 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 30560 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84130-0560 
JDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED 
MAC**'.-
/:* * 
•-;•....;.•:. - - u . i 
Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney at Law 
9> 
* . 
STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for DEFENDANT 
213 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2413 
Telephone: (801)363-7070 
Fax: (801)363-7071 
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IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIER.MAIR, 
Defendant / Petitioner. 
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PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(Informal Adjudicative Proceedings] 
JUCA 63-46b-15 "Judicial Review"J 
Agency File No. 697-9605 
c^J1-Mb-UQ>kk 
COMES NOW, the defendant/petitioner in the above-entitled action and hereby files 
this Petition for Judicial Review from Informal Adjudicative Proceeding of administrative 
agency [Driver License Division] and alleges in support thereof the following: 
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STEVEN LEE PAYTON (#2554) 
Attorney for DEFENDANT 
213 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2413 
Telephone: (801) 363-7070 
Fax: (801)363-7071 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COISRX 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
SEP 2 4 1997 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
LONNIE R. MAIR, 
Defendant / Petitioner. 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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MOTION TO VACATE 
AGENCY ACTION FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION 
[No Sworn Report] 
& 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITY 
[Agency File No. 697-9605] 
Case No. 97-090-6650 AA 
Judge, Anne M. Stirba 
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654 U . S. S U P R E M E COURT R E P O R T S 4 L e d 2d 
•[362 US 1991 
•SAM THOMPSON, Pe t i t ioner , 
v 
CITY O F L O U I S V I L L E e t al. 
362 US 199, 4 L ed 2d 654, 80 S Ct 624 
[No . 59] 
Argued J a n u a r y 11 and 12, 1960. Decided March 21 , 1960. 
SUMMARY 
Defendan t was convicted in t h e Police Cour t of Louisville, Kentucky, 
of two offenses, loi tering and disorderly conduct . As to loitering, t he record 
showed t h a t defendant, a long-t ime res iden t of t h e city, spent about half 
an h o u r in a public cafe ; t h a t he w a s seen on t h e floor dancing by himself, 
t h e r e be ing no th ing vulgar in h i s conduc t ; t h a t when asked by a police 
officer to account for his presence t h e r e , he said h e was wai t ing for a b u s ; 
and t h a t h e was in t h e cafe wi th t h e consent of t h e manager , who did 
no t object to any th ing defendant w a s doing. As to t h e charge of dis-
order ly conduct, t h e record showed only t h a t defendant , af ter he w a s 
a r r e s t e d and t aken out of t he cafe, w a s ve ry a rgumen ta t i ve . 
On ce r t io ra r i , t h e Uni ted S ta te s S u p r e m e Cour t unanimously reversed 
t h e convictions. I n an opinion by B L A C K , J. , i t w a s held t h a t i t is a viola-
t ion of due process to convict a m a n w i thou t evidence of his guilt, as w a s 
done in t h e p re sen t case. 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated 
Appeal and Error § 389 — substantial sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or about 
federal question. any premises without first having ob-
1. Although the fines imposed by a tained the consent of the owner or 
s tate court judgment are small, the controller of the premises, a convic-
Supreme Court of the United States tion is not supported by evidence, and 
will grant certiorari to review the does not comport with due process of 
judgment, where the due process ques- law, where the evidence fails to prove 
tions presented are substantial. all three elements of the loitering 
charge Constitutional Law §840; Evidence 
§ 995.5; Trespass § 6 — loitering Constitutional Law § 840 — due proc-
— elements of offense. ess — evidence — conviction for 
2. Under an ordinance making it un- loitering. 
lawful for any person, without visible 3. A conviction of violating by 
means of support, or who cannot give loitering a city ordinance which makes 
a satisfactory account of himself, to it unlawful for any person, without 
ANNOTATION REFERENCES 
1. Words as disorderly conduct, 48 ALR 2. Opprobrious words addressed to po-
83, 87. liceman as breach of peace, 34 ALR 566. 
T H O M P S O N v 
362 US 199, 4 L ed 
visible means of support, or who can-
not give a satisfactory account of him-
self, to loaf or t respass in any prem-
ises without first having obtained the 
consent of the owner or controller 
thereof, violates due process where all 
t he evidence showed was tha t defend-
ant , a long-time resident of the city, 
spent about half an hour in a public 
cafe ; he was seen on the floor dancing 
by himself, there being nothing vulgar 
in his conduct; when asked by a police 
officer to account for his presence 
the re he said he was wait ing for a 
b u s ; and he was in the cafe with the 
consent of the manager, who did not 
object to anything defendant was do-
ing. 
Constitutional Law § 840 — due proc-
ess — evidence — conviction for 
disorderly conduct. 
4. A conviction for disorderly con-
duct—under a city ordinance which, 
without definition, penalizes such con-
duct—violates due process, where the 
only evidence of "disorderly conduct" 
was the single statement of a police of-
ficer tha t defendant, after he was ar-
LOUISVILLE 655 
2d 654, 80 S Ct 624 
rested, was very argumentative, and 
there was no testimony tha t he raised 
his voice, used offensive language, re-
sisted the officer, or engaged in any 
conduct of any kind likely in any way 
to adversely affect the good order and 
tranquil l i ty of the city. 
[See annotation references 1, 2] 
Breach of Peace § 1 — disorderly con-
duct. 
5. Merely "a rgu ing" with a police 
officer cannot be "disorderly conduct." 
{See annotation references 1, 2] 
Arrest § 1 — waiver of objection. 
6. Under Kentucky law, if a man 
wrongfully arrested fails to object t o 
the ar res t ing officer, he waives any 
r ight to complain later that the ar res t 
was unlawful. 
Constitutional Law §§ 836, 840 — due 
process — evidence. 
7. Ju s t as a conviction upon a 
charge not made would be sheer denial 
of due process, so is it a violation of 
due process to convict and punish a 
man without evidence of his gu i l t 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
Louis L u s k y a rgued t h e cause for pe t i t ioner . 
H e r m a n E . F r i ck a rgued the cause for r esponden t s . 
Br ie f s of Counsel, p 1971, infra. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
Mr . J u s t i c e Black delivered t h e 
opinion of t h e Cour t . 
P e t i t i o n e r w a s found gui l ty in the 
Pol ice C o u r t of Louisville, Kentucky, 
of two offenses—loitering and dis-
o rde r ly conduct . T h e u l t imate 
ques t ion p resen ted to us is whe the r 
t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t pe t i t ioner were 
so to ta l ly devoid of ev iden t ia ry sup-
p o r t a s to r e n d e r h is conviction un-
cons t i tu t iona l u n d e r t he Due Process 
Clause of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amend-
m e n t . Decision of t h i s quest ion 
t u r n s n o t on t h e sufficiency of t h e 
evidence, b u t on w h e t h e r t h i s con-
vict ion r e s t s upon any evidence a t all. 
T h e fac t s a s shown by the record 
a r e s h o r t a n d s imple . Pe t i t ioner , a 
long- t ime r e s iden t of the Louisvil le 
a rea , w e n t in to the Liber ty E n d 
Cafe abou t 6:20 on Sa tu rday eve-
n ing , J a n u a r y 24, 1959- In addi t ion 
to sell ing food t h e cafe was licensed 
*[362 US 200] 
to sell beer to t he public and *some 
12 to 30 p a t r o n s were p resen t d u r -
ing t h e t ime pe t i t ioner was t h e r e . 
W h e n pe t i t ioner had been in t h e 
cafe abou t half an hour , two Louis -
ville police officers came in on a 
" r o u t i n e check." Upon seeing p e t i -
t ione r " o u t t h e r e on the floor d a n c -
ing by h imsel f / ' one of the officers, 
accord ing to h i s tes t imony, w e n t u p 
to t h e m a n a g e r who w a s s i t t ing on 
a stool nea rby a n d asked h im how 
long pe t i t ioner h a d been in t h e r e 
656 U. S. SUPREME 
and if he had bought anything. 
The officer testified that upon being 
told by the manager that petitioner 
had been there "a little over a half-
hour and that he had not bought 
anything," he accosted Thompson 
and "asked him what was his reason 
for being in there and he said he 
was waiting on a bus." The officer 
then informed petitioner that he was 
under arrest and took him outside. 
This was the arrest for loitering. 
After going outside, the officer tes-
tified, petitioner "was very argu-
mentative—he argued with us back 
and forth and so then we placed a 
disorderly conduct charge on him." 
Admittedly the disorderly conduct 
conviction rests solely on this one 
sentence description of petitioner's 
conduct after he left the cafe. 
The foregoing evidence includes 
all that the city offered against him, 
except a record purportedly show-
ing a total of 54 previous arrests of 
petitioner. Before putting on his 
defense, petitioner moved for a dis-
missal of the charges against him 
on the ground that a judgment of 
conviction on this record would de-
prive him of property and liberty1 
without due process of law under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in that 
(1) there was no evidence to sup-
port findings of guilt and (2) the 
two arrests and prosecutions were 
reprisals against him because peti-
tioner had employed counsel and de-
1. Upon conviction and sentence under 
§§ 85-8, 85-12 and 85-13 of the ordinances 
of the City of Louisville, petitioner would 
be subject to imprisonment, fine or con-
finement in the workhouse upon default of 
payment of a fine. 
2. Petitioner added that the effect of 
convictions here would be to deny him re-
dress for the prior alleged arbitrary and 
unlawful arrests. This was based on the 
fact that, under Kentucky law, conviction 
bars suits for malicious prosecution and 
even for false imprisonment. Thus, peti-
tioner says, he is subject to arbitrary and 
continued arrests neither reviewable by 
V > 
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manded a judicial hearing to *defend 
himself against prior and allegedly 
baseless charges by the police.* 
This motion was denied. 
Petitioner then put in evidence on 
his own behalf, none of which in any 
way strengthened the city's case. 
He testified that he bought, and one 
of the cafe employees served him, a 
dish of macaroni and a glass of beer 
and that he remained in the cafe 
waiting for a bus to go home.3 Fur-
ther evidence showed without dis-
pute that at the time of his arrest 
petitioner gave the officers his home 
address; that he had money with 
him, and a bus schedule showing 
that a bus to his home would stop 
within half a block of the cafe at 
about 7:30; that he owned two un-
improved lots of land; that in addi-
tion to work he had done for others, 
he had regularly worked one day or 
more a week for the same family 
for 30 years; that he paid no rent in 
the home where he lived and that his 
meager income was sufficient to 
meet his needs. The cafe manager 
testified that petitioner had fre-
quently patronized the cafe, and that 
he had never told petitioner that he 
was unwelcome there. The manager 
further testified that on this very 
occasion he saw petitioner "stand-
•[362 US 2021 
ing there in the middle *of the floor 
and patting his foot," and that he 
regular appellate procedures nor subject 
to challenge in independent civil actions. 
3. The officer's previous testimony that 
petitioner had bought no food or drink is 
seriously undermined, if not contradicted, 
by the manager's testimony at trial. 
There the manager stated that the officer 
"asked me 1 had [sic] sold him any thing 
to eat and I said no and he said any beer 
and I said no . . . ." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) And the manager acknowledged 
that petitioner might have bought some-
thing and been served by a waiter or 
waitress without the manager noticing it. 
Whether there was a purchase or not, how-
ever, is of no significance to the issue here. 
THOMPSON v 
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did not at any time during peti-
tioner's stay there object to any-
thing he was doing. There is no 
evidence that anyone else in the cafe 
objected to petitioner's shuffling his 
feet in rhythm with the music of the 
jukebox or that his conduct was 
boisterous or offensive to anyone 
present. At the close of his evi-
dence, petitioner repeated his motion 
for dismissal of the charges on the 
ground that a conviction on the fore-
going evidence would deprive him 
of liberty and property without due 
process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court denied the 
motion, convicted him of both of-
fenses, and fined him $10 on each 
charge. A motion for new trial, on 
the same grounds, also was denied, 
which exhausted petitioner's rem-
edies in the police court. 
• Since police court fines of less 
than $20 on a single charge are not 
appealable or otherwise reviewable 
in any other Kentucky court,4 peti-
tioner asked the police court to stay 
\he judgments so that he mi^ht have 
an opportunity to apply for certio~ 
ran to this Court (before his case 
became moot)* to review the due, 
process contentions he raised. The 
police court suspended judgment for 
24 hours during which time peti-
tioner sought a longer stay from the 
Kentucky Circuit Court. That 
court, after examining the police 
court's judgments and transcript, 
granted a stay concluding that 
"there appears to be merit" in the 
LOUISVILLE 657 
2d 654, 80 S Ct 624 
contention that "there is no evidence 
•[362US203] 
upon which *conviction and sentence 
by the Police Court could be based*' 
and that petitioner's "Federal Con-
stitutional claims are substantial 
and not frivolous."8 On appeal by 
the city, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals held that the Circuit Court 
jacked the power to grant the stay 
it did, but nevertheless went onTx> 
take the extraordinary step "ST 
granting its own stay, even though 
petitioner had made no original ap-
plication to that court for such a 
stay.7 Explaining its reason, the 
Court of Appeals took occasion 
to agree with the Circuit Court that 
petitioner's "federal constitutional 
claims are substantial and not 
frivolous."8 The Court of Appeals 
then went on to say that petitioner 
"appears to have a real question as 
to whether he has been denied due 
process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution, yet this substantive right 
cannot be tested unless we grant 
him a stay of execution because his 
fines are not appealable and will Tie 
satisfied by being served in jail be-
fore he can prepare and file his peti-
rtl tion for ce iorari. Appellee's sub-
stantive right of due process is of no 
avail to him unless this court grants 
him the ancillary right whereby he 
may test same in the Supreme 
Court."9 
Our examination of the record 
presented in the petition for certio-
*0A. Ky Rev Stat § 26.080; and see § 
26.010. Both the Jefferson Circuit Court 
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals held 
that further review either by direct appeal 
or by collateral proceeding was foreclosed 
to petitioner. Thompson v Taustine, No. 
40175, Jefferson (Kentucky) Circuit Court, 
Common Pleas Branch, Fifth Division (per 
Grauman, J.) (1959), unreported; Taus-
tine v Thompson (1959, Ky) 322 SW2d 100. 
w 5. Without a stay and bail pending ap-
plication for review petitioner would have 
1 4 L c d 2 d ] — 4 2 
served out his fines in prison in 10 days 
at the rate of $2 a day. Taustine v Thomp-
son (Ky) supra. 
6. Thompson v Taustine, No. 40175, 
Jefferson (Kentucky) Circuit Court, Com-
mon Pleas Branch, Fifth Division (per 
Grauman, J.) (1959), unreported. 
7. Taustine v Thompson (1959, Ky) 322 
SW2d 100. 
8. Id. 322 SW2d at 101. 
9. Id. 322 SW2d at 102. 
658 U. S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 4 L ed 2d 
rari convinced us that although the 
fines here are small, the 
Headnote i (jUe process questions 
presented are substantial 
and we therefore granted certiorari 
to review the police court's judg-
ments. 360 US 916, 3 L ed 2d 1532, 
79 S Ct 1433. Compare Yick Wo v 
Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L ed 220, 
6 S Ct 1064 (San Francisco Police 
•[2^62 US 204] 
Judges *Court judgment imposing a 
$10 fine, upheld by state appellate 
court, held invalid as in contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
The city correctly assumes here 
that if there is no support for these 
convictions in the record they are 
void as denials of due process.10 The 
pertinent portion of the city ordi-
nance under which petitioner was 
convicted of loitering reads as fol-
lows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any per-
son . . . , without visible means 
of support, or who cannot give a 
satisfactory account of himself, . . . 
to sleep, lie, loaf, or trespass in or 
about any premises, building, or 
other structure in the City of Louis-
ville, without first having obtained 
the consent of the owner or con-
troller of said premises, structure, 
or building; . . ." § 85-12. Ordi-
nances of the City of Louisville.11 
In addition to the fact that peti-
tioner proved he had "visible means 
of support," the prosecutor at trial 
said "This is a loitering charge here. 
There is no charge of no visible 
means of support." Moreover, 
there is no suggestion that petition-
er was sleeping, lying or trespassing 
in or about this cafe. Accordingly 
he could only have been convicted 
for being unable to give a satisfac-
10. For illustration, the city's brief in 
this Court states that the questions pre-
sented are "1. Whether the evidence waS 
sufficient to support the convictions, and 
therefore meets the requirements of the 
tory account of himself while loiter-
ing in the cafe, without the consent 
of the manager. Under the words of 
the ordinance itself, if 
Headnote 2 the evidence fails to 
prove all three elements 
of this loitering charge, the convic-
tion is not supported by evidence, 
in which event it does not comport 
with due process of law. The record 
is entirely lacking in evidence to 
support any of the charges. 
•[362 US 205] 
*Here, petitioner spent about half 
an hour on a Saturday evening in 
January in a public cafe 
Headnote* 3 which sold food and beer 
to the public. When 
asked to account for his presence 
there, he said he was waiting for a 
bus. The city concedes that there 
is no law making it an offense for 
a person in such a cafe to "dance," 
"shuffle" or "pat" his feet in time to 
music. The undisputed testimony of 
the manager, who did not know 
whether petitioner had bought 
macaroni and beer or not but who 
did see the patting, shuffling or 
dancing, was that petitioner was 
welcome there. The manager tes-
tified that he did not at any time 
during petitioner's stay in the cafe 
object to anything petitioner was 
doing and that he never saw peti-
tioner do anything that would cause 
any objection. Surely this is im-
plied consent, which the city ad-
mitted in oral argument satisfies the 
ordinance. The arresting officer ad-
mitted that there was nothing in any 
way "vulgar" about what he called 
petitioner's "ordinary dance," 
whatever relevance, if any, vulgar-
ity might have to a charge of loiter-
ing. There simply is no semblance 
due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . ." 
11. Section 85-13 provides penalties for 
violation of §85-12. 
[4 Led 2d] 
s* 
THOMPSON v 
362 US 199, 4 L ed 
of evidence from which any person 
could reasonably infer that peti-
tioner could not give a satisfactory 
account of himself or that he was 
loitering or loafing there (in the 
ordinary sense of the words) with-
out "the consent of the owner or 
controller" of the cafe. 
Petitioner's conviction for dis-
orderly conduct was under § 85-8 of 
the city ordinance which, 
Headnote 4 without definition, pro-
vides that "[w]hoever 
shall be found guilty of disorderly 
conduct in the City of Louisville 
shall be fined . . . ." etc. The 
only evidence of "disorderly con-
duct" was the single statement of 
the policeman that after petitioner 
was arrested and taken out of the 
cafe he was very argumentative. 
There is no testimony that petitioner 
raised his voice, used offensive lan-
guage, resisted the officers or en-
gaged in any conduct of any kind 
likely in any way to adversely affect 
the good order and tranquillity of 
*[362 US 206] 
the *City of Louisville. The only in-
formation the record contains on 
what the petitioner was "argumen-
tative" about is his statement that 
he asked the officers "what they ar-
12. Dc Jon^e v Oregon, 299 US 353, 3G2, 
81 L ed 278, 282, 57 S Ct 255. See also 
Cole v Arkansas, 333 US 196, 201, 92 L ed 
C44, G47, 68 S Ct 514. 
13. See Schware v Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 353 U S 232, 1 L ed 2d, 796, 77 S Ct 
752, 64 ALR2d 288; United States ex 
rel. Vajtauer v Commissioner of Immigra-
tion, 273 US 103, 106, 71 L ed 560, 563, 
LOUISVILLE 659 
2d 654, 80 S Ct 624 
rested me for." We assume, for we 
are justified in assum-
Headnote 5 ing, that merely "argu-
Headnote 6 ing" with a policeman is 
not, because it could not 
be, "disorderly conduct" as a mat-
ter of the substantive law of Ken-
tucky. See Lanzetta v New Jersey, 
306 US 451, 83 L ed 888, 59 S Ct 
618. Moreover, Kentucky law itself 
seems to provide that if a man 
wrongfully arrested fails to object 
to the arresting officer, he waives 
any right to complain later that the 
arrest was unlawful. Nickell v 
Commonwealth (Ky) 285 SW2d 
495, 496. 
Thus we find no evidence what-
ever in the record to support these 
convictions. Just as 
Headnote 7 "Conviction upon a 
charge not made would 
be sheer denial of due process,"12 so 
is it a violation of due process to con-
vict and punish a man without evi-
dence of his guilt.13 
The judgments are reversed and 
the cause is remanded to the Police 
Court of the City of Louisville for 
proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
47 S Ct 302; Moore v Dempsey, 261 U S 
86, 67 L ed 543. 43 S Ct 265; Yick Wo v 
Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L ed 220, 6 S Ct 
1064. Cf. Akins v Texas, 325 US 398, 402, 
89 L ed 1692, 1695, 65 S Ct 1276; Tot v 
United States, 319 US 463, 473, 87 L ed 
1519, 1527, 63 S Ct 1241 (concurring opin-
ion); Mooney v Holohan, 294 US 103, 79 
L ed 791, 55 S Ct 340, 98 ALR 406. 
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